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NORMA P. STRASSER, UTAHNA
P. BELNAP, LEILA P. SHIPP,
NEUMAN C. PETTY, JOHN K.
RUSSELL, Trustee, and HOW ARD
0. MILLER, Trustee, Partners of
PETTY INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a partnership doing business in the
StatP of Utah,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
vs.
GIN DY MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.

10274

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

I :

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL QUESTIONS
Respondent's answering brief is so at variance
on the facts and inferences of fact and so nonresponsive to part of the issues, that plaintiff regards a reply brief as desirable to sharpen the issues
m this case.
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Appellant regards the following as the questions to be decided:
1. Did Mickelson act as a franchised distributor for Gindy Manufacturing Co. (herein called
Gindy) or was Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. (herein
called Freeway) at all times the soliciting agent of
Gindy in securing and forwarding orders from prospective purchasers for Gindy trailers?

2. As regards plaintiff, is defendant estopped
to say that Freeway did not earn commissions on
the Milne and 1st interstate orders which after September 22, 1962 turned out to be fictitious and which
were on that date innocently misrepresented to plaintiff as true orders to induce definite and substantial
action on its part.
3. Did Freeway under the applicable law of
agency earn commissions on the Morrison and Peebles orders?
4. Does defendant's telegram of September
22, 1962 to plaintiff, in light of its wording and the
material surrounding circumstances, create an action of promissory equitable estoppel against defend·
ant as an "Informal contract without assent or con·
sideration" as spelled out in Section 90 of the Re·
statement of contracts and the judicial interpreta·
tion of that Section, or is it only an acknowledge·
ment of an assignment of commissions to be earned!
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VITAL DISAGREEMENTS ON FACTS AND
INFERENCES OF FACT
The first disagreement on the facts is as to the
relation among Gindy, Freeway and Mickelson. Defendant's brief, page 18, side-steps the facts which
estahlish the legal relation of these parties. It states:
On September 28, 1962, G. H. Mickelson
was a franchised distributor or dealer of trailers manufactured by Gindy - pursuant to
a written agreement executed March 1, 1962.
Plaintiff refers to the facts stated in its original brief, pages 9 to 11 inclusive, which show conclusively the facts to be, that Mickelson never purchased and resold even one, single trailer, which
by legal definitions is the established meaning of the
phrase "franchised distributor or dealer." The facts
are that on September 22, 1962 and ever since March
1, 1962, Freeway, a Utah, Mickelson-dominated corporation was in fact and law by the undisputed documentary and oral evidence the soliciting agent of
Gindy.
Freeway had earlier advertised in the yellow
pages of the telephone directory as Gindy's representative ( R. 30). Freeway had solicited for, secured
and sent to Gindy the eight orders and so-called
orders for trailers listed on page 21 of plaintiff's
original brief. The assignment of commissions to
plaintiff was from Freeway (Ex. 5) .

4

Defendant's telegram referred to orders from
Freeway and/ or Mickelson (Ex. 1). The loan by
plaintiff of $12,000 induced by reliance on Gindy's
telegram was made to Freeway (Ex. 4). Mickelson
testified that the agreement of March 1, 1962 was
intended to be an agreement between Gindy and
Freeway (R. 87).
Mr. Walters, Treasurer of Gindy, expressly rejected the idea that Mickelson ever acted as "a franchised distributor or dealer of Gindy trailers."
Mickelson had a concession from us in midAugust. The billing on this would be handled
by him. We billed and then the invoice went
unpaid for a substantial time. We contacted
Milne truck to determine why and he denied
he had the trailer or even ordered it (R. 128).
Q. When did you become aware of ..
Mickelson's financial difficulties, Mr. Walters? ...
A. Well, it was common knowledge Mick·
elson had financial problems as long as I re·
member (R. 121).
Q. Under your agreement with Mr. Mick·
elson he was to receive payment for these
trailers and then pay independently for them.
wasn't he? ...
THE WITNESS: No (R. 122).
There is no evidence in this case which would
call for a conclusion that the corporate ent I'ty of
Freeway shall be disregarded according to the fac·
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A. That was the facts - exactly as they
were understood. (Italics for emphasis.)
Respondent studiously avoids mentioning the
six factors which fulfill the requirements of an action of promissory equitable estoppel as outlined by
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th ed., 1941, Vol.
3, Section 805. (See plaintiff's original brief pp.
6-7.) It is understandable why this is so. The very
first factor as a basis of an action is that,
1. There must be conduct - acts, language, or silence - amounting to a representation or concealment of a material fact. (Italics supplied for emphasis.)

It is the representation relied upon, and acted
upon, in a definite and substantial manner by the
representee which determines the scope and ambit
of the promise. It is reliance and substantial action
in reliance on that representation which causes the
law to invoke estoppel against the representor and
which will not allow it to deny the particular representation on which the actor relied - otherwise injustice to the relying actor would result.

POINT III
WHILE THE OLD RULE WAS THAT REPRESENTATIONS AND PROMISES AS TO THE
FUTURE DO NOT ORDINARILY CREATE AN
ESTOPPEL THE PRESENT RULE WHICH ACCELERATED AS AN EXCEPTION UNDER THE

14
REPEATED APPLICATION OF SECTION 90 OF
THE RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS NOW
IS THE GOVERNING RULE IN SUCH CASES
WHEN ACTION OF DEFINITE AND SUBSTANTIAL CHARACTER IS INDUCED THEREBY.
The following statement of law is made in 31
C. J. S., Section 80 at pages 289-290:

"Notwithstanding the unaminity of the
courts with respect to - the statement of the
general rule" (p. 290) that "ordinarily a representation as to the future or a promise cannot create an estoppel" ( p. 289) "representations to the future or promises have been
enforced or permitted to operate as an equit- ,
able estoppel if to do otherwise would perpetrate a fraud or cause injustice in a case where
the representation or promise" (or both together) "has been made to induce action and
has in fact induced action on the part of thr
party setting up the estoppel. This exception
has come to be known as the doctrine of promissory estoppel: In such cases it is held that
the party making the promise" (or representation and integrated promise) "is estopped
to assert the lack of consideration therefor."
(pp. 290-291) (Italics added for emphasis and
applicability to the instant case.)
The 1963 Cumulative Supplement to 31 C. J. S.,
Section 80 cites 93 cases decided in 17 states and the
United States Courts which approve the so-calle.d
exception to the old general rule. See accord: Ame;·1•
can Jurisprudence, Estoppel, Sections 52 and o3.
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A CASE IN POINTS
A leading case in point is People's National
Bank v. Lynebarger Construction Co. ( 1951) 219
Ark. 11, 240 S. W. 2d 12, 48 A. L. R. 2d 1086.

The defendant contractor importuned the bank
to make weekly advances of funds to a subcontractor
for the meeting of payrolls. The bank was to take
assignments of payments due and to come due from
the contractor to the subcontractor. The bank made
the advances on representations of the contractor
of periodic estimates of amounts to become payable
to the subcontractor in the next pay period. On August 12th the contractor represented that $16,000.00
would become due on the following September 15th
one month and four days later. The subcontractor
became bankrupt in the meantime and did not finish
the job.
The contractor had overestimated the amount
to be paid on the contract, a fact discovered later to
be overestimated by a sum of $11,996.07. Upon action, the bank was allowed recovery of the amount
advanced, namely $11,996.07 on strength of the representation of the contractor as to a future probability which turned out to be an innocent, but false
l'epresentation, if future occurrences could be proved
by the contractor. Estoppel prevented such proof.
The governing rule is stated by the Arkansas
Court as follows :
He who by his language or conduct leads
another to do what he would not otherwise
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have done, shall not subject such person to
loss or injury by disappointing expectations
on which he relied.

The rule as stated by the Arkansas Supreme ,
Court is pertinently applied to the varying fact situ.
ations in the 93 cases cited in the 1963 Suppliment
to 31 C. J. S., Sec. 80. It should be applied in this
case.
Williston & Thompson, Contracts, 1938 ed., Sec.
1508 indicate that today the defendant would be
estopped in a Derry v. Peek case 14 A. C. 337.

The Oregon Supreme Court in applying the
fraud-preventing doctrine usually called promissory !
estoppel - sometimes called simply equitable estoppel - in the case of Schafer v. Fraser ( 1955) 206
Or. 446, 290 P. 2d 190, 48 A. L. R. 2d 1087 adopts
a highly descriptive phrase from tort law. Instead '
of using the customary terminology of the reprtsentator-promissor's intent that his language should,
or expectation that his language would, induce the
contemplated kind of conduct, the court uses the tort
test for this factual requirement, namely, that of
"forseeability by the representator-promissor as a
reasonable man" that his language will induce "con·
duct of the kind which occurred."
Respondent argues that Gindy "did not represent that the 'orders in or pending' would in fact
materialize into sales or earned commissions." (Respondent's brief, p. 9.)
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If we were dealing only with a law action of
deceit requiring scienter concurrent with the representation that would be true. But the fraud or injustice spoken of in promissory equitable estoppel
is not concerned with scienter. It is concerned with
the fraud or injustice which will occur to the plaintiff if the defendant is not estopped to say that the
orders which he represented would easily produce
$17,000 of commissions have not produced (for this
case) $9,500. 00.
Respondent's argument as to the futuro nature
of the representation assumes that we are not discussing whether the facts of this case are one in
which equitable estoppel should be applied against
defendant to prevent injury to the plaintiff. Certainly respondent will be forced to admit that if the court
in looking for the six requirements for invoking the
doctrine of equitable estoppel and finds them, then
defendant will be estopped to say, that its representation that it had on hand "orders in or pending" "to
more than cover this" ( $17 ,000) "did not materialize into sales or commissions."
We respectfully submit that the factual requirements of promissory, equitable estoppel as outlined
on pages 6 and 7 of plaintiff's original brief are
fully made out and that relief should be granted to
plaintiff as prayed in its original brief in this case.
A. LADRU JENSEN and
RICHARDS, BIRD and
HART
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-

